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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STANLEY TITLE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintijf and Appellant,
vs.
THE CONTINENTAL BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
12271

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF CASE
Stanley Title Company appeals from the order
of the District Court dismissing its complaint.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court dismissed plaintiff's complaint
with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Stanley Title Company seeks to vacate the order
of the lower court, and require it to deny the motion
to dismiss, and order Continental Bank to answer or
otherwise plead to the complaint.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case has been before this court twice be:fore. The first time was when this appellant appealed from the judgment entered against it in favor of
both Harlin Construction Company and this respondent.1 This court upon hearing that appeal expressly
affirmed both judgments of the lower court. This
court concluded in that decision:
"The findings and judgment of the trial
court in favor of plaintiff Harlin Construction Company against Continental Bank and
against George Stanley and Stanley Title Company are sustained; and the same order is
made as to the findings and judgment in favor
of Continental Bank on its cross-complaint
against George Stanley and Stanley Title Company."

W. P. Harlin Constriwtion Company vs. The Contin.ental Bank and Trust Company, et al., Case No.
11504, 23 Utah 2d 422, 464 P.2d 585 (1970).
On February 24, 1970, Continental satisfied
,plaintiff's judgment against it and a Satisfaction of
Judgment was filed. (case no. 12180, R. p. 655) Upon filing of the Satisfaction of Judgment and pursuant to the provisions of the original judgment, the
District Court on February 26, 1970, entered judg•.
lThe Notice of Appeal was filed by both The Stanley Title
Company and George Stanley from both (a) judgment in favor .of
plaintiff, and (b) judgment "in favor of the defendant The Continental Bank and Trust Company and against the defendants, Stanley
Title Company and George Stanley." Harlin vs. Continental Bank,
ct al.; this court's case no. 11504, R. p. 194.
·

2
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ment against Stanley Title Company and George
Stanley and in favor of Continental Bank (this
court's case no. 12271, R. p. 11-12) and a copy of such
judgment was mailed to counsel for Stanley Title
Company and George Stanley. (case no. 12271, R. p.
13)
Subsequently, defendant George Stanley appealed from the judgment against him, alleging that the
cross-judgment against him in favor of Continental
was without jurisdiction, and asking that this court
reverse its prior judgment against him and set aside
the ruling of the Honorable Stewart Hanson affirming such judgment. On February 4, 1971, this court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court and reaffirmed its former opinion. (Appellate case no. 12180)
Now Stanley Title Company, which had been
incorporated under the laws of the State of Utah,
brings another appeal flowing from this original
judgment. This appeal arises from an independent
action to set aside a judgment, which was served·
upon Continental on July 2, 1970. The complaint of
Stanley Title Company alleges that the prior judgment is "void for want of due process of law under
the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the State
of Utah." (Complaint, paragrah 6, case no. 12271,
R. p. 2) Stanley Title Company appended certain
of the pleadings from the original action as well as a
portion of the transcript of counsel's agreement asexhibits to its complaint.
3
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Continental filed a motion to dismiss which
stated:
'''Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint:
1. For failure to state a claim against this
defendant upon which relief may be granted.
2. Plaintiff corporation was a Utah corporation. Its franchise was suspended in 1967
for failure to pay taxes, and it has failed
to file an annual report since 1968.
Pursuant to § 59-13-61 UCA 1953 upon
non-payment of taxes by a Utah corporation,
all of its corporate powers, rights and privileges are suspended and such plaintiff is barred from bringing this action.
Dated this 10th day of July, 1970." (Case
no. 12271, R. p. 15)
,
Continental's motion was heard before the Honorable James S. Sawaya on August 14, 1970. Contin~ntal contended in argument that there were no disputed facts, and that this case should be decided as a
matter of law. Continental presented a certificate of
the Secretary of State which showed that effective
September 30, 1967, Stanley Title Company was suspended by the State Tax Commission of the State of
Utah pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-13-61 ( 1953), and that the last annual report
of such corporation required by Utah Code Ann.§ 1610-121 ( 1953) was filed by plaintiff with the Secretary of State on March 6, 1968. (A photocopy of the
4
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Secretary of State's certificate is set forth in the appendix.) These facts were not disputed by appellant
at the time of argument of the motion, appellant
ra:ther arguing at that time that as a matter of law
this did not prohibit plaintiff from bringing this action, because such action was part of the winding up
of the corporation.
Continental argued that the case should be dismissed for two reasons: 1. Plaintiff had no capacity
to bring this action; 2. The matter had already been
determined. These two issues were argued. Counsel
for plaintiff Stanley Title Company had present in
court the official file in the original case.
On September 1, 1970, the lower court executed
the following order:
'Defendant's Motion to Dismiss coming
on for hearing before The Honorable Jam es
Sawaya on Friday, August 14, 1970; plaintiff
being represented by George Stanley, Esq.,
and defendant by Albert J. Colton of Fabian
& Clendenin, and argument being heard, and
the court having considered the pleadings, the
entire file in W. P. Harlin Construction Company vs. The Continental Bank and Trust
Company, et al., Civil No. 269179, in the DJstrict Court of Salt Lake County, and the stipulated fact that the records of the Secretary of
State of Utah show that effective September
30, 1967, plaintiff was suspended by the State
Tax Commission of the State of Utah pursuant to the provisions of Sect'ion 59-13-61 U~
C.A. 1953, and that the last annual report re1
'

1
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quired by Section 16-10-121 U.C.A. 1953 was
filed by plaintiff with the Secretary of State
on March 6, 1968, and the court, therefore,
pursuant to Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, having treated defendant's motion
as. one. for _summary judgment, and no facts
being in dispute, and good cause appearing
therefor;
It is hereby ORDERED:
The plaintiff's complaint be and hereby
is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 1st day of September, 1970."
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RULE 12(c) WAS PROPERLY INVOKED AND
APPLIED, AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS
RIGHTFULLY GRANTED.

There is no genuine issue as to any material fact
in this action which is in dispute. The facts are those
contained in the official file of the original case and
the official records in the office of the Secretary of
.State.
If this case were to be sent back for trial on the
merits, the trial court would have nothing more before it than what was before the lower court at the
time of Continental's motion.
The sole. questions which have to be decided are
questions of law, viz. ( 1) whether plaintiff's complaint, in light of the facts set forth in the official file
6
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of the original case state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; (2) whether suspension of the corporation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-61
( 1953) and failure to file annual reports required
by Utah Code Ann.§ 16-10-121 (1953) since March
6, 1968 would bar a plaintiff from commencement on
July 2, 1970 of an action to set aside the prior judgment. Contrary to appellant's assertion, both of these
issues were clearly raised in Continental's motion.
Rule 56 (b) provides:
''(b) For Defending Party. A party
against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross~
claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is
sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof."
The purpose of the rule is to obtain quick and
inexpensive dispostion of cases where no facts are in
dispute. Such relief was granted. If the lower court
was in error in applying the law to these facts, this
court may at this time so state. However, respondent
urges that there are two separate and distinct legal
bases for upholding the dismissal, each fatal to this
appeal.
POINT II
THIS MATTER HAS ALREADY BEEN ADJUDICATED.

Co-defendant George Stanley in a separate appeal (this court's case no. 12180) contended that the
judgment against him was without justification be..
7
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cause in the initial pleadings in the case he was not
specifically named as a defendant to Continental's
cross-claim. Continental in that appeal argued that
such contention is without merit as George Stanley
consented to the court's jurisdiction and determination of this matter, inter alia, by appealing to this
court from such judgment on its merits, and that the
issue was argued in briefs, and this court affirmed
such judgment.
However, this co-defendant, Stanley Title Com. pany, does not even have this slender reed to lean upon. The cross-claim of Continental specifically names
Stanley Title Company as a cross-defendant (case
no. 12271, R. p. 7) and an answer to the cross-claim
was filed by Stanley Title Company (case no. 12271,
R. p. 10).
At the end of the trial the court made findings
of fact and conclusions of law and judgment was entered providing for judgment
'' (a) in favor of plaintiff Harlin against
Continental, Stanley Title and George Stanley,
jointly and severally; and (b) upon payment
of this judgment by Continental Bank and
Trust Company to plaintiff, Continental Bank
and Trust Company do have and recover from
Stanley Title Company and George Stanley,
jointly and severally, the sum of $10,503.60 ... " (case no. 11504, R. p. 189)
This judgment was affirmed on appeal by this court.
Respondent has difficulty in following appellant's argument on this point. It appears that appel8
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lant contends that such judgment is unconstitutional
under the due process clause because "The crossclaim is contingent on the outcome of the original action and does not state an existing cause of action."
(Appellant's brief, case no. 12271, p. 13)
But such argument flies directly in the face of
Rule 13 ( f) which provides:
"(f) Cross-Claim Against Co-Party. A
pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim
by one party against a co-party arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the original action or of
a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of the original
action. Such cross-claim may include a claim
that the party against whom it is assert€d is
or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all
or part of a claim asserted in the action against
the cross-claimant."
The allegation of Continental was that if it were
found jointly liable with the other defendants, it
nevertheless had a claim over against such defendants if it had to satisfy the judgment itself. The cross-·
claim was a request for a determination as to who
was to be ultimately liable among the various codef endan ts.
The argument that Continental '·'dismissed and
abandoned" its cross-claim is wholly without merit,
as an examination of the entire transcript of argument and the specific argument of this point in Continental's appellate brief and the judgment of this
9
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court shows. It is wholly without merit even from
the quotation from argument which appellant uses.
Respondent is further puzzled by appellant's
contention that no findings and conclusions were
filed by Continental, but rather the conclusions were
those '''of Harlin Construction Company." Respondent had always assumed, and still believes this to
be the law, that the findings and conclusions formally
entered are those of the court, not of any party. The
findings, conclusions and judgment adjudicated the
rights and duties among all of the parties in this action.
But it is unnecessary to rebut appellant's contentions in any detail. The simple facts of the record
are enough. Continental filed a timely and proper
cross-claim against this appellant, which this appellant answered. Judgment on the cross-claim was entered in favor of Continental and against appellant.
This appellant appealed from that judgment on its
merits, and this court expressly affirmed the judgment. The matter is res judicata.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF HAS NO STANDING TO SUE

Appellant brought this as a separate action in
equity to set aside a judgment. Respondent contends
that suspension of appellant by the State of Utah on
September 30, 1967 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
59-13-61 ( 1953) prohibits appellant from bringing
such an action.
10
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-61 (1953) provides as
follows:
"Failure to pay tax - Suspension or forfeiture of corporate rights. If a tax computed
and levied hereunder is not paid before 5 o' clock p.m. on the last day of the eleventh month
after the date of delinquency, the corporate
powers, rights and privileges of the delinquent
taxpayer, if it is a domestic corporation, shall
be suspended, and if a :foreign corporation, it
shall thereupon forfeit its rights to do intrastate business in this state.
"The tax commission shall transmit the
name of each such corporation to the secretary
of state, who shall immediately record the
same in such manner that it may be available
to the public. The suspension or forfeiture
herein provided lfor shall become effective from
the time such record is made, and the certificate of the secretary of state shall be primafacie evidence of such suspension or :forfeiture." (emphasis added)
Appellant seeks to avoid the sanction of this statute in several ways. Thus it argues that "from the
face of the record the present action was commenced
before the charter was suspended." (Appellant's
brief, case no. 12271, p. 11) This is patently not so.
This was a separate, independent action in equity by
appellant's own admission. (Appellant's brief, case
no. 12271, page 1) Appellant was suspended in September, 1967. This action was not commenced until
July of 1970.
Appellant does raise a more interesting argu11
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ment in con'tending that the code provision relating
to winding up after dissolution expressly gives the
corporation the power to sue, quoting Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10-101 ( 1953). But merely to read that section
is to disprove appellant's claim. The section provides:

"Continuation of corporate existence to
wind up after d'issolution. Nothwithstanding
the dissolution of a corporation either ( 1) by
the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by
the secretary of state, or (2) by a decree of
court, or ( 3) by expiration of its period of
duration, the corporate existence of such corporation shall nevertheless continue for the
purpose of windin'g up its affairs in respect to
any property and assets which have not been
distributed or otherwise disposed of prior to
such dissolution, and to effect such purpose
such corporation may sell or other wise dispose
of such property and assets, sue and be sued,
contract, and exercise all other incidental and
necessary powers.''
Appellant here is not claiming to be acting because of either ( 1) the issuance of a certificate of dissolution of the secretary of state, or (2) a decree of
court, or ( 3) expiration of its period of duration. It
is not alleged that the corporation is dissolved and is
winding up. The facts are that it has been suspended,
and while it is suspended its ''corporate powers,
rights and privileges" are suspended. Indeed, any attempt to ,exercise such rights, privileges or powers is
made a misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-62
( 1953). I ts "powers, rights and privileges" of course
would include the right to bring an independent ac12
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tion in equity to set aside a judgment. Relief from
such suspension may be obtained by proper application and payment of twice the amount of tax and penalties due, and thereupon the Secretary of State is
authorized to issue a certificate of revivor. Utah Code
Ann.§ 59-13-63 (Supp. 1969). But no claim is here
made that this has been done.
Utah Code Ann.§ 59-13-62 ( 1953) which makes
exercise of the rights, privileges or powers of a corporation which is suspended under Utah Code Ann.§
59-13-61 (1953) for failure to pay tax a misdemeanor, evidences a legislative intent to deny all corporate
activities, including access to courts, to the delinquent
taxpayer. The legislative intent becomes even more
clear upon consideration of Utah Code Ann.§ 59-1363 (Supp. 1969) which provides for revivor upon
payment and states that:
''The revivor shall be without prejudice
to any action, defense or right which has accrued by reason of the original suspension or
forfeiture."
Had the legislature not intended to deny the delinquent corporation access to the courts, this sentence would have been unnecessary and certainly
would not have been carried forward from the old
statute into the 1969 amendment. Respondent submits that the three sections discussed above, when
read together, reveal an effective and self-executing
scheme of corporate tax collection.
On the other hand, Utah Code Ann.§§ 16-10-100
13
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and 16-10-101 ( 1953) are designed to allow a dissolved corporation to wind up its affairs and dispose
of its assets. This is necessary for the three specific
situations provided for in those sections, but has no
applicability to a corporation which is suspended for
failure to pay taxes. Furthermore, such an expansive
interpretation of winding up would weaken the effect of the suspension. In short, dissolution is clearly
distinguishable from forfeiture and suspension. See
Bland vs. Knox Concrete Products, 207 Tenn. 206,
338 S.W. 2d 605. The distinction has been made by
the legislature and should be followed by the court.
Appellant has the legal means of curing this disability. It has the means of obtaining the keys to the
courthouse. But it must pay the State of Utah its
proper taxes first.
Appellant asserts that "[t]he closest case in
point is that of Prudential Fed. S. & L. Ass'n. vs.
Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 7 Utah 2d 366, 325 P.2d
899." ('Appellant's brief, case no. 12271, p. 11) If
the assertion is correct, there is no controlling case
law on this issue. Prudential involved a foreign corporation which had qualified to do business in Utah,
but forfeited for failure to pay taxes during the pendency of the litigation. To allow a suit to proceed
under such circumstances serves the purpose of judicial efficiency. It does, however, weaken the effect
of foref ei ture and suspension as a tax collection device. Thus, in cases which involve no competing interest, such as judicial efficiency, Prudential should be
held closely to its facts.
14
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It is unfortunate that appellant has not included a transcript of the argument on the ruling of the
lower court, as it is the clear recollection of counsel
for the respondent that the issue as to plaintiff's suspension was admitted at that time, and the argument
was joined on the applicability of the "winding up"
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 16-18-101 ( 1953).
Indeed, the lower court in its Order of Dismissal refers to the entire file in the original case "and the
stipulated fact that the records of the Secretary of
State of Utah show that effective September 30,
1967, plaintiff was suspended." (case no. 12271, R.
p. 20) Inasmuch as the suspension is a matter of
public record, it would be an unnecessary formality
to require this case to be returned merely for the formal insertion of this fact in the record. This court
may take judicial notice of "public and private official acts of the legislature, executive and judicial
departments of this state ... " Utah Code Ann.§ 7825-1 (3), and it is hoped that this court would do so·
in this instance, so that this issue may be decided on
its merits.
CONCLUSION
Respondent contends that this action is without
merit. Its position is similar to that taken in Harlin
vs. Continental (case no. 12180) and r e j e c t e d
by this court, but here the case is even stronger
for Continental, Stanley Title Company having been
specifically named as a cross-defendant from the
;15
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time of the initial pleadings, and Stanley Title Company having no legal standing to commence an action.
A determination and dismissal of the case by
summary judgment is the proper and most expeditious manner of dealing with the problem and tllis the
lower court did.
Respectfully submitted,
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
By ALBERT J. COLTON
Attorneys for
Defendant-Respondent
800 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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I, CLYDE L. MILLER, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT

The Office of the Secretary of State made a record

effective September 30, 1967 reflecting the suspension of STANLEY TITLE
COMPANY, a domestic corporation of the State of Utah, by the State Tax
Commission of the State of Utah pursuant to the provisions of Section 59-13-61.
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Replacement Volume 6.
I further certify that the last Annual Report of the corporation
required by Section 16-10-121, Utah Code Annotated 1953, Replacement Volume 2,
was filed in this office on March 6, 1968.

AS APPEARS _ _ _.>:0:..f...!R,,,e.,c"'o~rd,,,____ IN MY OFFICE.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF. I HAY• H•REUNTO

err

MY HAND

AND AFl'IXED THE GREAT SEAL OF THE STAT• OF UTAH
AT SALT LAKE CITY, THIS--...JNlll.:iL.InLttJlh_ _ _ _ DAY OP
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